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) Case No. 19766 
REX PAUL BASS, an individual, ) 
Defendant and JOANN BASS, an ) 
individual, ) 
Defendant-Appellants, ) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued Defendant to foreclose on a second 
mortgage on property which was in the possession of Defendant-
Appellant JoAnn (Bass) Bartell pursuant to a Decree of Divorce, 
and in which she had an ownership interest. 
The lower court entered a Judgment, Decree of 
Foreclosure and Order of Sale. After the property was sold, 
Defendant-Appellant made a motion for an order requiring 
Plaintiff-Respondent to pay her the amount of her homestead 
exemption, which motion was denied. 
The Appellant sought to have the Order and Judgment 
entered by the lower court denying her motion for payment of her 
homestead exemption amount reversed, and to have the case 
remanded with instructions for the lower court to enter an Order 
and Judgment requiring Plaintiff-Respondent to pay Defendant-
Appellant the amount of her homestead exemption and to determine 
the amount of interest, costs and reasonable attorneys1 fees to 
be awarded to Appellant for her having to pursue this matter in 
the lower court and on appeal to enforce her homestead rights. 
On June 2, 1988, the Supreme Court issued its decision 
denying Defendant-Appellant's appeal. 
Defendant-Appellant, JoAnn Bass Bartell, petitions the 
Court to grant a rehearing in the above-entitled case, pursuant 
to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Counsel for 
Petitioner certifies that this petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner asserts the following point of law in 
support hereof: 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL HOMESTEAD, THERE EXISTS 
NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ENFORCEMENT OF A NON-VENDOR 
MORTGAGE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF A MECHANIC'S LIEN, 
WHICH ACTIONS MUST BE GIVEN CONSISTENT TREATMENT, AND 
NEITHER OF WHICH IS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE HOMESTEAD 
A. Utah Constitutional and Early Legislative History 
Regarding the Homestead Exemption Gave Equal 
Treatment to Foreclosures of Mechanic' s Liens and 
Mortgages 
In discussing the Varian-Richard1s proposal which 
eventually was adopted as the Constitutional provision, the 
Framers never discussed the enforcement of mechanicsf liens or 
the enforcement of mortgages against the homestead. 
Prior to and during the Constitutional Convention, the 
laws of Utah allowed both mechanicsf liens and mortgages to be 
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foreclosed upon a homestead. Compiled Laws of Utah, 3429(11) 
(1888). As the Court has noted on page 6 of its decision, Mr. 
Varian stated at the convention that the then existing state 
exemption statue of 1888 was presumed to be a good law, although 
it was not subjected to any analysis. 
The first legislature to meet after the Constitution 
was adopted maintained the same exemption language regarding the 
enforcement of mechanics' liens and mortgages against the 
homestead. See Laws of the State of Utah, Ch. LXXI, § 1 (1896). 
On pages 6-7, the Court interprets the existence of the 
1888 and 1896 statutes to imply that the Framers and the early 
Utah legislators did not intend the "sale on execution" language 
of the Constitutional homestead to apply to mortgage 
foreclosures. However, since mechanics' liens were also exempt 
under these laws, it also follows, using the Court's logic, that 
the Framers did not intend mechanic's lien foreclosures to be 
"sales on execution." 
B. Volker (I) and Evans v. Jensen Decisions, taken 
together, hold that non-vendor's liens and 
mechanics' liens are "sales on execution" under 
the Constitutional Homestead 
This implication regarding non-vendor mortgages 
and mechanics' liens not being "sales on execution" was given 
short shrift by the Court in Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. 
Vance, 32 Utah 74, 88 P.896 (1907) (hereinafter cited as "Volker 
(I)"), appeal after retrial, 36 Utah 348, 103 P.970 (1909), which 
held that a mechanic's lien foreclosure was a "sale on execution" 
and was not enforceable against the homestead. 
This decision, which was rendered only a few years 
after the Constitutional Convention, was the first to really 
consider the parameters of the homestead section. 
In unsupported dicta, the Volker (I) Court stated that 
the Constitution places no inhibition on the voluntary alienation 
of a homestead. Id at 83. However, the voluntary alienation 
issue was not presented, argued or briefed. The Volker (I) Court 
made a strained distinction between a mechanic!s lien 
foreclosure, which they described as being "involuntary," and a 
mortgage foreclosure, which was denominated as "voluntary." Id. 
The Utah Constitutional homestead law, however, makes no such 
differentiation between "voluntary" and "involuntary" sales. It 
merely protects against "sales on execution" no matter how they 
arise. The Volker (I) Court did not cite or consider the 1867 
California Supreme Court decision in Peterson v. Hornblower, 
discussed infra. 
In other words, this strained distinction rewrites the 
Constitutional homestead to be exempt form "forced sale," 
although the Constitutional Convention rejected numerous 
proposals that contained the "forced sale" language in favor of 
using the "sale by execution" language. Indeed, the Court1s 
decision would make Utah's homestead provision just like the 
homestead provisions of many of the other states (which only 
provide protection from "forced sale"). 
However, it is clear that the Utah Constitutional 
homestead provision is unique and unlike the provisions in other 
states. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 7-11. The 
Court in Utah Builder's Supply Company v. Gardiner (Rehearing), 
86 Utah 257, 259, 44 P.2d 789 (1934), stated that: 
The Constitution and statutes of some of the other 
states are radically different from our own, and, . . . 
there is of necessity a different construction. 
This Court should not rewrite the Constitution by adding the word 
"forced" where it does not exist and was not intended to apply. 
The logic the Volker (I) Court presented to support its 
case for excluding mechanics' liens from the homestead is equally 
applicable to non-vendor mortgages. They noted first that if the 
legislature was permitted to subject the homestead to a 
mechanic's lien, but could not do so "if the debt arose in some 
other way, is making a distinction not made by the Constitution." 
Id. at 84. The same logic applies for mortgages. Second, they 
examined constitutions of other states and found that most of 
them specifically provided for the homestead to be subject to 
mechanics' liens, but Utah's did not. Id. The same can be said 
with regard to mortgages in those other states. Finally, they 
reviewed the proceedings of the Utah Constitutional Convention, 
and found that every proposal to allow mechanic's liens to attach 
to homesteads was rejected. Id. The same argument applies to 
mortgages but to an even greater degree, as even more Constitu-
tional proposals were offered and rejected in this regard. 
After the above review, the Court stated: 
[I]t is obvious that the constitutional provision 
exempts a homestead from execution sale without 
restriction, limitation, or exception of any kind." 
- 5 -
Id, (Emphasis added,) 
The next time the Court was faced with interpreting the 
"sale on execution" limitation was in Evans v. Jensen, 51 Utah 1, 
168 P. 762 (1917), another mechanic's lien foreclosure case. The 
Evans Court broke ranks with the unsupported dicta in Volker (I) 
which had tried to distinguish between mortgage and mechanic's 
lien foreclosures as it related to the homestead exemption: 
[T]he person who performs the labor or furnishes the 
materials, upon compliance with the statute, is just as 
entitled to a specific lien against the property as 
though he had obtained a mortgage, 
e e • 
The [mechanic's lien] statute entered into the 
contract, and was just as much a part of it as though 
it had been expressly set forth. 
Id. at 9-10. 
When one enters into a contract which results in a 
mechanic's lien foreclosure, that act of contracting is just as 
"voluntary" as the giving of a mortgage, and then defaulting 
under it. Therefore, non-vendor mortgages and mechanic's liens 
are both "voluntary" encumbrances. 
By applying the reasoning of Volker (I) to non-vendor 
mortgages, such mortgage foreclosures are "sales on execution" 
under the constitutional homestead, just like mechanic's lien 
foreclosures. This approach allows us to interpret the 
Constitutional homestead by giving it a rational and obvious 
construction based on its clear language, without rewriting it. 
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C. Even before the Utah Constitutional Convention was 
held, the California Supreme Court had held that 
mortgage and mechanic's liens foreclosures were 
not "forced sales," but were "sales on 
execution." 
In Peterson v. Hornblower, 33 Cal. 266 (1867), 
decided many years before the Constitutional Convention of Utah, 
the California Supreme Court considered a mortgage foreclosure 
under their "forced sale" Constitutional homestead law. It 
placed its emphasis on the word "forced," and stated that: 
"[A] 'forced sale' is not synonymous with a 'sale on 
execution. ... The latter may be and often is 
voluntary in every respect. ... Its guality, as being 
voluntary or forced, depends not upon the mode of its 
execution, but upon the presence or absence of the 
consent of the owner. 
It makes no difference in respect to its being forced 
or voluntary, whether [the owner] consents directly to 
the sale or does the same indirectly by consenting to 
or doing those acts or things that necessarily or 
usually eventuate in a sale. A foreclosure sale, 
whether under the power of sale contained in the 
mortgage or in pursuance of a decree, is not a forced 
sale within the meaning of the [California] 
Constitution. 
That is, neither the foreclosure of a mortgage (direct consent), 
nor the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien (indirect consent), are 
"forced sales." According to the California Court, they are both 
"sales on execution." 
The strained distinction the Volker (I) Court made 
between mortgage foreclosures and mechanic's lien foreclosures 
(voluntary versus involuntary) was not a well-accepted position 
in the law at the time Volker (I) was decided. Thus, the Framers 
at the Utah Convention should have known that mechanics' liens 
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and mortgage foreclosure sales were not "forced sales," but were 
"sales on execution." 
In placing the "sale on execution" language in the Utah 
Constitutional homestead section, the men of the Convention had 
the means to know (by reviewing the Peterson decision) that such 
language would provide protection also against "voluntary" 
encumbrances (mortgages and mechanics' liens). 
D. Both mortgage foreclosures and mechanic's lien 
foreclosures are "sales on execution" under Utah 
statutes and cases. 
1. Mortgages 
The chapter of the Utah Code entitled "Mortgage 
Foreclosure" states, in relevant part: 
Judgment shall be given . . . and the sale of mortgaged 
property, to satisfy said amount . . . and directing 
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to 
the provisions of law relating to sales on execution, 
and a special execution or order of sale shall be 
issued for that purpose. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-1. (Emphasis added.) By the 
foregoing reference to "the provisions of law relating to sales 
on execution," the subject section incorporates the provisions 
concerning general execution sales under Rule 69 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
With respect to its reference to a "special execution," 
the guestion arises as to whether a "special execution" is an 
"execution sale" or a "judicial sale." The general rule is that 
a sale 
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made under a statutory fspecial execution1 . . . 
partakes of the nature of a judicial sale if the 
statute requires that the sale be reported to and 
confirmed by the court, and makes the sale binding and 
complete only when it is confirmed, since the act of 
confirmation is a judicial act, otherwise, it is a 
'sale on execution.1" 
47 Am.Jur.2d, Judicial Sales § 3; see also, 30 Am.Jur.2d, 
Executions § 304. 
In Utah, once a decree of foreclosure and order of sale 
are entered on a mortgage, the trial court has finished its 
duties, and neither reviews nor confirms the foreclosure sale. 
First National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57 
P.2d 1401 (1936). Even the entering of the deficiency judgment 
is performed by the Court Clerk. Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-2. 
In discussing mortgage foreclosure sales, the Supreme Court has 
consistently referred to them as "sales on execution," and not as 
judicial sales. See, e.g., Reader v. District Court, 98 Utah 1, 
94 P.2d 858 (1939); Local Realty v. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297, 85 
P.2d 770 (1938); First National Bank, supra. 
A further question arises concerning the nature of an 
"order of sale", like the one utilized by the Plaintiff in the 
case sub judice, under the mortgage foreclosure provisions. In 
Utah Builders Supply v. Gardiner, 86 Utah 250, 39 P.2d 327 
(1934), rehearing denied, 86 Utah 257, 42 P.2d 989, (1934), the 
Court specifically held that an "order of sale" (used in Utah in 
foreclosing both mortgages and mechanic's liens) is a "sale on 
execution" unenforceable within the meaning of the Constitutional 
homestead law, in reliance on Volker (I) and on Payson Exchange 
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Sav. Bank v, Tietjen, 63 Utah 321, 225 P.2d 598 (1924). 86 Utah 
at 253-259. 
Because both "special executions" and "orders of sale" 
fall within the ambit of "sales on executions" in this state, 
non-vendor mortgages which utilize such procedure during 
foreclosure may not be enforced against the homestead. 
2. Mechanics' Liens 
When mechanics1 liens are foreclosed, the law 
states that: 
The court shall cause the property to be sold in 
satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the case of 
foreclosure of mortgage, subject to the same right of 
redemption. 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-15. (Emphasis added.) 
Exactly the same sale procedure is followed as in the 
case of mortgages (i.e., according to the "law relating to sales 
on execution," and through special executions or orders of sale). 
Thus, the mechanic's lien foreclosure procedure is also a "sale 
on execution" under the Constitution, from which the homestead is 
protected. 
The Court's decision on page 10 engages in some 
historical analysis as it relates to mortgage foreclosures, and 
suggests that such foreclosures are "judicial sales" and not 
"execution sales," because they are quasi in rem proceedings. 
However, mechanic's lien foreclosures are also quasi in rem 
proceedings, and must be foreclosed using the same kinds of 
proceedings used for a mortgage. If the Court's analysis is 
accepted, then both mortgage and mechanic's lien foreclosures 
would be deemed "judicial sales." As such, they would both 
necessarily receive the same treatment under the homestead law. 
On page 13 of its decision, the Court states that in 
interpreting statutes, one must look to the plain language of the 
statute and only if that language is ambiguous may such language 
be ignored. The Utah mortgage statute, which is incorporated 
into the mechanic's lien statute, clearly states that the 
"sheriff shall . . . sell the same according to the provisions of 
law relating to sales on execution." Utah Code Annotated § 78-
37-1 (1987) (emphasis added). It is difficult to understand how 
the legislature could have been any clearer. Mortgage 
foreclosures -- and, thus, mechanic's lien foreclosures -- are 
undeniably "sales on execution" under this mortgage section. 
In Local Realty v. Lindquist, supra, the Supreme Court 
determined that the "sale on execution" language in the mortgage 
statute did not define any rights as between the mortgagee and 
the mortgagor, but merely indicated the procedure to be utilized 
in selling the property. The case was not decided in relation to 
the homestead provision. 
To determine if a particular case involves a "sale on 
execution," the only method that can be used is to look at the 
procedure that is followed during the foreclosure phase. The 
Lindquist Court said that the "sale on execution" language is 
procedural, so this language identifies the procedure used in 
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mortgage foreclosures, which procedure is according to the law 
for "sales on execution." Further, the Lindquist Court on pages 
772 and 773 refers to the mortgage foreclosure in two different 
passages. One describes it as being a "sale on execution" and 
the other describes it as "an execution sale." 
E. Conclusion 
Foreclosures of non-vendor mortgages and mechanics' 
liens must be treated the same way under the Utah constitutional 
homestead law, because both types of foreclosures are "sales on 
execution." By the express language of the Constitutional 
homestead, the homestead is exempt from "sales on execution." 
Because this pending decision and the Volker (I) decision treat 
these two types of sales on execution differently, this 
constitutional disparity should be corrected by the Court on 
rehearing and reconsidering this Appeal. 
DATED this 16th day of June, 1988. 
Respectfully^submitted, 
/J£^i-~Frankl~in Farf 
Michael F. Jones 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
JoAnn Bass Bartell 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit No. 19766 
Union, F I L E D 
Plaintiff and Respondent, June 2, 1988 
v. 
JoAnn Bass, an individual, 
Rex Paul Bass, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David B. Dee 
Attorneys: Paul Franklin Farr, Bruce L. Richards, 
Mark A. Wolfert, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Jon C. Heaton, James A. Boevers, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
STEWART, Justice: 
JoAnn Bass appeals the trial court's denial of her 
motion for payment of her homestead exemption from amounts 
received by plaintiff, P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union 
(P.I.E.), from a foreclosure sale of her home. We affirm. 
I. FACTS 
On October 19, 1979, while still married, Bass and 
her ex-husband, Rex Paul Bass, signed a promissory note in 
favor of P.I.E. which was secured by a nonpurchase money 
second mortgage on their home. Subsequent to their divorce in 
1980, JoAnn Bass retained possession of the mortgaged property 
and continued to reside there with her two children. P.I.E. 
filed a complaint February 10, 1982, to foreclose the second 
mortgage because of defaults in the payments on the note. 
Bass then recorded a declaration of homestead on the property 
on March 29, 1982, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-4 
(1987). On January 24, 1983, P.I.E. obtained a judgment, a 
decree of foreclosure, and an order of sale from the district 
court. The property was sold pursuant to the court's order 
for an amount in excess of Bass's homestead exemption. Prior 
to bringing this action and after the sale of the property, 
Bass's attorney sent two letters to P.I.E's attorney demanding 
payment of the homestead exemption in the amount of $11,000. 
P.I.E. denied having an obligation to remit money to Bass for 
her homestead exemption. The issue was submitted to the 
district court. Bass's motion asserting that under Utah Code 
A^e*)ds>\ 
Ann. § 78-23-3(2) (b) (1987), * her homestead exemption 
prevailed over P.I.E.'s mortgage lien and that no security 
interests, purchase money or otherwise, may be excluded from 
the debtor's homestead exemption provided in Article XXII, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
On appeal, Bass argues that to be constitutional 
under Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, 
§ 78-23-3(2)(b) must be limited to purchase money liens. If 
the statute is so construed, then P.I.E.'s nonpurchase money 
note and mortgage do not take priority over Bass's homestead 
exemption, and she is entitled to receive the amount of her 
homestead exemption from P.I.E. 
P.I.E. asserts three alternative arguments in support 
of the trial court's ruling. The first is that nothing in 
Article XXII, Section 1 precludes the enforcement of voluntary 
encumbrances on the homestead because that section only 
exempts homestead property from "sale on execution" and a 
mortgage foreclosure is not a "sale on execution," as that* 
term is used in the Constitution. Second, P.I.E. asserts that 
§ 78-23-3(2)(b) creates a constitutionally valid exception to 
the homestead exemption for enforcement of nonpurchase money 
as well as purchase money security interests in property. And 
third, P.I.E. argues that if appellant is found to have a 
valid homestead exemption, she has waived it by voluntarily 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3(1) and (2) provide: 
(1) A homestead consisting of property in 
this state shall be exempt in an amount 
not exceeding $8,000 in value for a head 
of family, $2,000 in value for a spouse, 
and $500 in value for each other 
dependent. A homestead may be claimed in 
either or both of the following: 
(a) one or more parcels of real 
property together with appurtenances and 
improvements; 
(b) a mobile home in which the 
claimant resides. 
(2) A homestead shall be exempt from 
judicial lien and from levy, execution or 
forced sale except upon the following 
obligations: 
(a) statutory liens for taxes and 
assessments on the property; 
(b) security interests in the 
property and judicial liens for debts 
created for the purchase price of such 
property; and 
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts 
created by failure to provide support or 
maintenance for dependent children. 
No. 19766 2 
signing the note and second mortgage. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
The common law recognized no homestead exemption. 
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 218, 48 P.2d 513, 521 (1935); 
Cook v. Higley, 10 Utah 228, 37 P. 336 (1894). Consequently, 
homestead exemptions exist only by a legislative act. Higley, 
10 Utah at 229, 37 P. at 336-37. The majority of states, 
either under constitutional provisions supplemented by 
statutes or solely by statutes, have some form of homestead 
exemption from execution or forced sale. 
The general purpose of a homestead exemption is to 
protect citizens and their families from the miseries of 
destitution. See, e.g., Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 
203, 69 P.2d 614, 617 (1937); Gammett v. Storrs, 15 Utah 336, 
340, 49 P. 642, 643 (1897); Knudsen v. Hannberg, 8 Utah 203, 
208, 30 P. 749, 751 (1892). Absent constitutional or 
statutory restrictions, the homestead may be mortgaged and 
subjected to sale through foreclosure proceedings. United 
States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stevens, 93 Mont. 11, 17, 17 P.2d 
62, 65 (1932); 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homestead § 115 (1968). 
Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
states: 
The Legislature shall provide by law, 
for the selection by each head of a 
family, an exemption of a homestead which 
may consist of one or more parcels of 
lands, together with the appurtenances and 
improvements thereon of the value of at 
least fifteen hundred dollars, from sale 
on execution. 
The first issue we consider is whether the phrase 
"sale on execution," as used in Article XXII, Section 1, was 
intended by the framers of the Utah Constitution to encompass 
the judicial enforcement of consensual liens, such as the 
nonpurchase money mortgage securing the promissory note 
involved here. 
A. Framer's Intent 
When interpreting constitutional language, it is 
appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence of the framers7 
intent, State v. Betensen, 14 Utah 2d 121, 378 P.2d 669 
(1963); Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 12 
Utah 2d 189, 190, 364 P.2d 417, 418 (1961); General Electric 
Co. v. Thrifty Sales, 5 Utah 2d 326, 334, 301 P.2d 741, 746 
(1956), including the record of debates during the 
constitutional convention. American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 
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701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1985); General Electric Co., at 746; 
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, 32 Utah 74, 84, 88 P. 
896, 899 (1907). Those debates indicate that the wording of 
the homestead provision was given careful consideration. The 
framers initially considered adopting verbatim the homestead 
article from the Michigan constitution. It read: 
Every homestead of not exceeding 
forty acres of land, and the dwelling 
house thereon, and the appurtenances to be 
selected by the owner thereof, and not 
included in any town plat, city or 
village; or instead thereof, at the option 
of the owner, any lot in any city, village 
or recorded town plat, or such parts• of 
lots as shall be equal thereto, and the 
dwelling house thereon, and its 
appurtenances, owned and occupied by any 
resident of the State, not exceeding in 
value fifteen hundred dollars, shall be 
exempt from forced sale on execution, or 
any other final process from a court, for 
any debt contracted after the adoption of 
this Constitution. Such exemption shall 
not extend to any mortgage thereon, 
lawfully obtained; but such mortgage or 
other alienation of such land by the owner 
thereof, if a married man, shall not be 
valid without the signature of the wife to 
the same. 
Mich. Const, of 1850, Art. 16, § 2 (emphasis added.) 
Opposition to this proposal centered on three main 
issues. First, it was not as generous to large families as 
the then-e*isting Utah statute which allowed the head of the 
household $1,000, an additional $500 in value for his wife, 
and another $250 for every minor child. Second, Utah was 
considered unique in that many Utahns had small city lots with 
larger noncontiguous acreage outside the city, and the 
proposal did not take this into consideration. Third, the 
proposal was thought to be too specific for constitutional 
enactment. See 2 Proceedings and Debates of the 
Constitutional Convention for the State of Utah, 1769-1771 
(1898) (hereinafter 2 Proceedings) . 
Several amendments to the Michigan provision were 
proposed to correct the first two problems, none of which was 
acceptable to the delegates. A Mr. Creer offered an entirely 
new provision for consideration based on the law in Wyoming, 
which read: 
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A homestead, as provided by law, shall be 
exempt from forced sale, under any process 
of law, and shall not be alienated without 
the joint consent of husband and wife, 
when that relation exists, but no property 
shall be exempt from sale for taxes, or 
for the payment of obligations contracted 
for the purchase of said premises, or for 
the erection of improvements thereon. 
2 Proceedings, at 1772 (emphasis added). The Creer proposal 
was criticized because it "contemplate[d] matters that might 
properly be left to the Legislature" and was promptly rejected 
by the committee. Id. at 1773-74. 
The proposal eventually adopted by the Convention was 
suggested by Mr. Varian and later amended at Mr. Richards' 
prompting to provide a minimum $1,500 exemption. The 
Varian-Richards proposal generated much discussion and was 
viewed by the delegates as a vehicle to secure permanently a 
minimum homestead exemption, while at the same time allowing 
future legislatures flexibility to modify the exemption amount 
and other details to accommodate current conditions. At the 
Convention, Mr. Varian stated: 
[W]hy should we undertake to fix these 
matters of detail for all time, or at 
least until the Constitution shall come to 
be amended? [This is a question] of 
public policy, depending from time to time 
upon the condition of the people and the 
necessities which exist. . . . That is to 
say, insist that there shall be the 
necessary exemptions for the protection of 
poor debtors, . . . but leave that 
necessity to be determined from time to 
time by the Legislature, which is better 
enabled to pass upon the question . . . 
than this Constitutional Convention. 
2 Proceedings, at 1774-75. Mr. Varian also stated in response 
to delegate questions: 
Now, this constitutional provision simply 
guarantees that [the homestead exemption] 
. . . shall never be obliterated. It must 
be maintained in some form or other. 
. . . The Legislature, in dealing with 
this question, would regulate the whole 
subject with reference to the exemption 
and necessities of the case. . . . [J]ust 
as sure as you undertake now to cover the 
subject, you will ascertain that you have 
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omitted something, when it is too late, or 
conditions and necessities of your people 
may change. 
Id. at 1781-82. 
There was virtually no discussion at the Convention 
as to what significance, if any, should be attached to the use 
of the term "sale on execution" in the final wording instead 
of the "forced sale" or "forced sale on execution" terminology 
used in various other proposals. 
The Utah statutes, prior to and during the 
constitutional convention, provided that enforcement of 
certain types of liens was outside the scope of the 
Article XXII, Section 1 homestead exemption. The Compiled 
Laws of Utah, § 3429(11) (1888), stated in pertinent part: 
No . . . property mentioned in this 
section is exempt from execution issued 
upon a judgment recovered for its purchase 
price, or any portion thereof, or upon a 
judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage or a 
mechanics' or laborers7 lien thereon, or 
exempt from sale for taxes. 
Two comments made by Mr. Varian at the Convention 
support the conclusion that the delegates viewed the existing 
homestead statute as harmonious with Article XXII, Section 1 
as adopted. Mr. Varian stated: "[A]s it stands now, with 
this provision in the Constitution, the existing law will be 
maintained until the Legislature shall modify or change it 
. . . ." 2 Proceedings, at 1782. Mr. Varian also stated: 
[L]et me call the attention of the 
committee to the fact that we have, I 
presume, what is deemed to be a good 
exemption law. It has been on the statute 
book for a number of years. Under this 
Constitution it would be continued in 
force until changed by the Legislature. 
Id. at 1781. 
Moreover, if the 1888 statute was in conflict with 
the language of Article XXII, Section 1, the Legislature 
certainly had the opportunity in 1896, the first year 
following the Convention, to change the statute. However, the 
Legislature retained the pertinent language of the 1888 
statute. See Laws of the State of Utah, ch. LXXI § 1 (1896). 
Thus, both the framers of the Constitution, and the 
members of the first Legislature (many of whom were delegates 
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to the Constitutional Convention) apparently did not intend 
the "sale on execution" language of Article XXII, Section 1 to 
apply to the sale of homestead property pursuant to a mortgage 
foreclosure • If the framers of the Utah Constitution had 
intended to exempt homesteads from all forced sales pursuant 
to a foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien, they failed to 
evidence that intention. 
B. Scope 
However, if the framers did not intend all mortgage 
foreclosures to be subject to and within the scope of the 
constitutional homestead exemption, it is unclear why an 
exception for all mortgages from the exemption was provided 
for by statute. Apparently, the framers and the first 
legislators believed either (1) that Article XXII, Section 1 
allowed the Legislature to create statutory exceptions to the 
homestead exemption, or (2) that the statute simply defined 
what types of liens did or did not fall under the term "sale 
on execution" used in Article XXII, Section 1. 
This Court held in Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. 
Vance, 32 Utah 74, 85, 88 P. 896, 899 (1907), that because 
Article XXII, Section 1 does not itself provide for any 
exceptions to "sale on execution," the Legislature is not free 
to create statutory exceptions.2 The Court stated, "[I]t is 
obvious that the constitutional provision exempts a homestead 
from execution sale without restriction, limitation, or 
exception of any kind." Volker-Scowcroft, 32 Utah at 84, 88 
P. at 899. Revised Statutes of Utah, § 1156 (1898), allowed 
the enforcement of mechanic's liens against homestead 
property. The Court held that the enforcement of such liens 
was a statutory form of execution sale and an unconstitutional 
narrowing of Article XXII, Section 1. Volker-Scowcroft, 32 
Utah at 81, 88 P. at 898. 
However, the Court specifically distinguished the 
enforcement of a purely statutory lien from the enforcement of 
a consensual security interest. The Court construed 
Article XXII, Section 1 not to provide any restriction on 
voluntary encumbrances of the homestead and concluded that a 
lien on the homestead arising from a voluntary contract 
between the parties was outside the scope of the homestead 
exemption—impliedly because the nature of a sale of such 
mortgaged property would be a judicial sale not within the 
2. Other courts have agreed that a legislature's power to 
create exceptions from a constitutional exemption is limited. 
In re Vonhee, 238 F. 422, 424 (W.D. Wash. 1916); Hodges v. 
Cooksey, 33 Fla. 715, 733, 15 So. 549, 552 (1894); Burrows v. 
Brooks, 113 Mich. 307, 310, 71 N.W. 460, 461 (1897); Tuttle v. 
Strout, 7 Minn. 465, 466 (1862); Donaldson v. Voltz, 19 W. Va. 
156, 159 (1881). 
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term "sale on execution." The Court stated: 
In the absence of an express contract 
creating it, the lien which a materialman 
or mechanic may become entitled to depends 
solely upon the statute for its existence. 
. . . The decree ordering the property 
sold in satisfaction of the judgment 
obtained rests alone for its authority 
upon the statute, and not upon any 
contract made by the defendant, and hence 
the order of sale is clearly an execution 
sale within the meaning of the 
Constitution. 
Volker-Scowcroft, 32 Utah at 83-84, 88 P. at 899. 
Although the Legislature has no power to restrict, 
defeat, or in any way impair the homestead right given in 
Article XXII, Section 1, Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah at 
203, 69 P.2d at 617; Utah Builders' Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 
Utah 257, 259, 42 P.2d 989, 990 (1935), the Court in 
Volker-Scowcroft recognized that because Article XXII 
Section I is not self-executing, the Legislature is authorized 
to "provide remedies for the protection of the homestead 
rights created and secured by the Constitution, and [it] may 
regulate the claim of the right so that its exact limits may 
be known and understood . . . ." Volker-Scowcroft, 32 Utah at 
82, 88 P. at 898 (emphasis added). 
Utah case law supports the proposition that the 
enforcement of consensual security interests is outside the 
scope of Article XXII, Section 1. In Kimball v. Salisbury, 17 
Utah 381, 53 P. 1037 (1898), this Court considered the 
homestead statute found in Compiled Laws of Utah, § 3429(11) 
(1888) , amended by Laws of the State of Utah, ch. LXXI 
(1896). Thfe Court construed the term "sale on execution" in 
Article XXII, Section 1 narrowly. In discussing the purpose 
for the homestead statute, and by implication Article XXII, 
Section 1, the Court declared: 
The object of the statute was to foster 
families as factors and beneficiaries of 
society, and thus promote the general 
welfare, and secure their permanency, and 
protect their homesteads from forced sale, 
as far as could be done without injustice 
to others. 
Kimball, 17 Utah at 391, 53 P. at 1039 (emphasis added). See 
also Folsom v. Asper, 25 Utah 299, 306, 71 P. 315, 317 (1903) 
(states have right to establish homestead and other exemptions 
from forced sales on execution) . 
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In an apparent attempt to distinguish the 
applicability of the homestead exemption as against secured 
obligations, the Court stated, "Under this statute, the head 
of the family • . . has his home and lands set apart for a 
homestead for the benefit of himself and family, free from any 
personal obligation held by any creditor . . . ." Kimball, 17 
Utah at 391, 53 P. at 1039 (emphasis added). 
As recently as 1978, this Court stated, relying on 
Panagopulos, "The purpose of the homestead exemption of 
Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution is to protect 
'the dependent and helpless' and to insure such persons 
shelter and support free from fear of forced sale." Sanders 
v. Cassity, 586 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). 
In this case, appellant argues that Peterson v. 
Hornblower, 33 Cal. 266 (1867), supports the conclusion that 
at the time of Utah's Constitutional Convention, a nonpurchase 
money mortgage foreclosure was considered to be a "sale on 
execution" subject to the reach of Article XXII, Section 1. 
We do not agree that Hornblower so holds. The court in 
Hornblower construed the homestead provision of the California 
Constitution, which exempted property from "forced sale" in 
relation to the homestead statute which exempted property from 
"'forced sale on execution, or other final process.'" Id. at 
276 (emphasis added). The issue was whether a nonpurchase 
money second mortgage could be foreclosed against the 
homestead property. The court distinguished "forced" from 
"voluntary" sales, holding that if the owner of a homestead 
consents (i.e., by giving a mortgage) to a sale under 
execution or other legal process, it is not a forced sale. 
Id. The court concluded that a foreclosure sale pursuant to a 
judicial decree is not a "forced sale," but a voluntary sale, 
and therefore the homestead exemption did not prohibit the 
enforcement of nonpurchase money mortgages. Id. at 277. The 
court did ftot specify, however, whether it considered the 
mortgage foreclosure an execution sale or a sale by "other 
legal process." 
At least one court has concluded that Hornblower 
specifically did not equate a foreclosure sale with an 
execution sale. According to Nevada Nat'l Leasing Co. v. 
Hereford, 144 Cal. App. 3d 622, 192 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1983), 
Hornblower "held that an execution or foreclosure sale of real 
property consented to by the owner was not a 'forced sale' 
. • . ." Id. at 619 (emphasis added). Although Hornblower 
and most case law hold that a mortgage foreclosure is not a 
forced sale, this Court on at least one occasion has reached a 
different conclusion. In Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 
Utah 297, 309, 85 P.2d 770, 775 (1938), the Court declared 
that there are three types of forced sales that are against 
the will of the debtor: (1) execution sales generally, 
(2) foreclosure sales, and (3) tax sales. However, Lindquist 
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is distinguishable from Hornblower because Lindquist did not 
determine the nature of a foreclosure sale in the context of 
the constitutional provision. 
There has been much confusion as to the meaning and 
interrelationship of the terms "execution," "execution sale," 
"sale on execution," "forced sale," "foreclosure sale," and 
"judicial sale," both at common law and recently. 
Historically, "judicial sales" and "execution sales" were 
viewed as fairly distinct and separate concepts.3 The 
difference in their nature was articulated by one commentator 
in 1878: 
In making ordinary execution sales, simply 
by virtue of his office, the sheriff or 
marshall acts as a ministerial officer of 
the law—not as the organ of the court. 
. . . His authority to sell rests on the 
law and on the writ, and does not, as in 
judicial sales, emanate from the court. 
D. Rorer, A Treatise on the Law of Judicial and Execution 
Sales, § 590 (2d ed 1878) (hereinafter Rorer). Discussing the 
nature of judicial sales, Rorer observed, "Judicial sales 
. . . occur only in proceedings wholly or partly in rem. In 
this respect they are widely contradistinguished from 
execution sales, at law, where the judgment is exclusively in 
personam, and wherein the sale is that of the officer and not 
that of the court." Id. at § 31 (footnotes omitted).4 In 
discussing mortgage foreclosures, Rorer states: 
Judicial sales, in proceedings partly in 
rem and partly in personam, are where the 
proceedings are of a mixed nature, being 
directly against the property and also, 
personal against the owner, as in 
3. See Nat'l Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Kemp, 184 Kan. 648, 
656, 339 P.2d 368, 375 (1959); First National Bank v. Barons, 
109 Kan. 493, 495, 200 P. 297, 298 (1921); 50 C.J.S. Judicial 
Sales § 1 (1947). One early commentator recognized that some 
sales are not easily categorized. Special executions were 
seen at common law as "partly partaking of the nature of an 
execution at law and of an order of sale in chancery. . . . 
It may be judicial and it may be ministerial, as either 
feature predominates; and it may partake of the qualities of 
each in some respects." D. Rorer, A Treatise on the Law of 
Judicial and Execution Sales, § 592 (2d ed. 1878) . 
4. A proceeding to foreclose upon a mortgage is considered an 
action in rem or quasi in rem under Utah law. First Nat7! 
Credit Corp. v. Von Hake, 511 F. Supp. 634, 639 (D. Utah 
1981); Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 178, 104 P. 117, 
122 (1909). 
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proceedings to foreclose deeds of mortgage 
by judicial sale. In such cases, there is 
a proceeding in rem against the property, 
and at the same time personal process 
against the mortgagor to bring him as 
defendant into court. . . . 
Yet the sale is none the less a 
judicial sale, and the sale of the court. 
Id. at §§ 53-54 (footnote omitted). Rorer makes clear his 
view that mortgage foreclosures are judicial sales, as is any 
sale "whenever a right or proceeding is enforced, by a sale 
made by a judicial order or decree, under direction of the 
court as contradistinguished from sales on execution." Id. at 
§ 29. 
Nevertheless, the distinctions between a "judicial 
sale" and an "execution sale" are unclear, especially in a 
jurisdiction like Utah which does not require judicial 
confirmation of a foreclosure sale. First Nat'l Bank v. 
Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 157-58, 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (1936). 
Moreover, recent Utah decisions do not seem to treat judicial 
and execution sales as mutually exclusive categories. 
Executions have been characterized as a form of judicial or 
forced sale", Larsen v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co. Inc., 564 
P.2d 1128, 1129 (Utah 1977); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 
29, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (1971), much like mortgage 
foreclosures. Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 
1983). 
states: 
The Utah statute authorizing mortgage foreclosures 
There can be but one action for the 
recovery of any debt or the enforcement of 
any right secured solely by mortgage upon 
real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
chapter. Judgment shall be given 
adjudging the amount due, . . . and the 
sale of mortgaged property . . . to 
satisfy said amount . . . and directing 
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same 
according to the provisions of law 
relating to sales on execution, and a 
special execution or order of sale shall 
be issued for the purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1987) . This Court has held, 
however, that the reference in § 78-37-1 to provisions 
relating to sale on execution does not indicate that a 
foreclosure sale is the same in nature as an execution sale 
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generally, although they are somewhat analogous. Lindquist/ 
96 Utah at 301, 85 P.2d at 772. The reference "has merely 
procedural significance" and simply "directs that in making 
the sale under foreclosure proceedings the sheriff shall 
proceed in the same way as he does in making sales under 
executions generally." Id. 
Accordingly, we hold that a mortgage foreclosure sale 
is not a "sale on execution" for purposes of Article XXII, 
Section T of the Utah Constitution. 
II. STATUTORY HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
The present statute was adopted in 1981 as part of a 
comprehensive change in Utah's exemption laws.5 This change 
was implemented by the passage of the Utah Exemption Act, 
which was modeled after the Uniform Exemption Act. Appellant 
insists that the phrase "for the purchase price of such 
property" modifies both "security interests" and "judicial 
liens." This construction is urged upon the Court for two 
reasons. First, the statute is ambiguous and therefore should 
be given a broad and liberal construction in favor of the 
homestead right in order to accomplish the remedial and 
beneficial purposes for which it was designed. Second, to 
interpret it otherwise would be to create an exception not 
provided in the Constitution. 
It has always been the general policy of this and 
most other courts that homestead statutes should be liberally 
construed. However, this preference for liberal construction 
should not be used to protect debtors from the performance of 
"just obligations." Zanone v. Sprague, 16 Cal. App. 333, 337, 
116 P. 989, 990 (1911). Moreover, homestead exemption 
statutes "must be construed and interpreted to give effect to 
the purposes and objects the framers of the Constitution and 
the Legislature had in mind in the enactments." Panagopulos, 
93 Utah at 204-05, 69 P.2d at 618. 
The statute which preceded Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-23-3(2) (1987) unquestionably excepted all lawful 
mortgages, whether for purchase money or not, from the 
homestead exemption, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (1953), 
(repealed 1981), as has every homestead statute ever enacted 
in Utah, including those in effect prior to statehood. 
Accordingly, we must decide whether the Legislature intended 
to effect such a radical departure from over one hundred years 
of statutory precedent. We conclude it did not. 
When the language of a particular provision of a 
statute is ambiguous, the Court may attempt, following 
principles of statutory construction, to ascertain the 
5. See footnote 1. 
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intention of the Legislature; but where there is no ambiguity 
the plain language of the statute must be taken as the 
expression of the Legislature's intent. Miles v. Wells, 22 
Utah 55, 62, 61 P. 534, 536 (1900). "The best evidence of the 
true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act 
is the plain language of the Act." Jensen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). In the 
present case, a literal reading of the statute, i.e. , 
"security interests in the property and judicial liens . . . " 
(emphasis-added), precludes appellant's construction without 
torturing the syntax of the provision. 
This conclusion is in harmony with the only other 
case we have been able to find construing Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-23-3(2)(b) (1987). The court in In re Williamson, 43 
Bankr. 813 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) , held that the provision 
denominated two distinct exceptions and that the phrase "for 
the [sic] debts created for the purchase price of such 
property" modifies only the term "judicial liens" and does not 
modify the term "security interests." Id. at 829; The court 
further held, "[t]he term 'security interest' as used in the 
Utah statute, was meant to embrace any consensual security 
interest in the property by which the owner of said property 
voluntarily pledges that property as security for a debt 
regardless-of the purpose of the debt." Ld. We agree. We 
find no ambiguity in the statute or any indication that the 
Legislature intended to alter the long-standing law of this 
state. Therefore, we hold that Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3(2) (b) 
(1987) is a legislative expression that enforcement of all 
consensual security interests, whether they are the result 
either of purchase money or of nonpurchase money obligations, 
is not within the scope of the homestead exemption as created 
by Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
The owner of property should not be allowed to hold 
that property out as security for a debt, with the credit 
received very possibly contingent on that security interest, 
and then have the opportunity to cut off the security by 
claiming a homestead exemption. See In re Williamson, 43 
Bankr. at 829-30. The power to sell the homestead includes 
the power to mortgage it. S. Thompson, A Treatise on 
Homestead and Exemption Laws, § 456 (1878) . As the court in 
Hornblower recognized: "Concede to the owner of the homestead 
the power to give the mortgage, and the remedy for its 
enforcement by foreclosure and sale necessarily follow[s]." 
Hornblower, 33 Cal. at 278. Furthermore, the policy of 
allowing a consensual security interest, including a 
nonpurchase money mortgage, to be enforced against the 
homestead makes sense in light of the history of the Utah 
homestead exemption. 
We hold that Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3(2) (b) (1987) is 
a constitutionally valid expression of the scope of the 
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exemption of homestead property from "sale on execution" 
created by Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, all consensual security interests in land may be 
enforced against homestead property. Because we hold that 
Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-23-3(2)(b) do not provide a homestead exemption from 
foreclosure sale, the issue of appellant's waiver of that 
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